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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff initiated the instant action against
the defendants to acquire by eminent domain their property
for road construction purposes.

The case was tried before

a jury with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding.

Plain-

tiff appealed and alleged error by the trial court.

The

Supreme Court reversed the trial court after examination
of the briefs of the parties.
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RELIEF SOUGHT
The plaintiff seeks to have defendants1 Petition
for Rehearing denied and an affirmation of this court's
decision of May 20, 1976, reversing the trial court and
remanding the case to the District Court for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE OPINION EVIDENCE
OF THE PROPERTY OWNER INADMISSIBLE, SINCE ITS BASIS WAS
NOT PERMITTED BY LAW.
The defendants, in their Petition for Rehearing, seem
to be arguing that whenever a witness in a condemnation
case is the owner of the property to be taken, that such
witness can then testify to anything he so desires relating to the value of his property and said testimony is
properc

This position is clearly contrary to the law«

A witness, even after he has qualified to render opinion
testimony is governed by the requirements of relevance,
competence, foundation and all other rules of evidence
applied by the court.
In a condemnation case, as the plciintiff has already pointed out in its brief, the testimony relating
to just compensation must be what the "fair market value"
of the subject property was on the date of taking.

Even

a qualified witness cannot be allowed to testify as to
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his opinion of what just compensation is if he uses a
basis of something other than that which would establish
"fair market value."
The property owner, in the instant case, used as
his basis for value what the property was worth to him,
that h£ would hot have sold it for less and operating
the tavern on the property was his life's work.

These

elements or criteria are not proper in establishing
fair market value.
To support this conclusion, the plaintiff refers
this court to the cases cited in its brief on appeal
filed'in this case, the cases cited in this courtfs
opinion and the case of Brown v. Town of Eustis, 293 F.
197 (D.C. Florida) (1923) , wherein the court rejected
an owner's testimony because it was based on the personal
value to him and not market value.
This proposition is also stated in Nichols on Eminent
Domain as follows:

1

"Sentimental value to
the owner, or his unwillingness to part with the property,
can have no consideration in
determining market value. . . . "
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 4
§ 12.2[2] pp. 12-79, 12-80

This court was absolutely correct in its finding
that, "The basis upon which the owner stated the value
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of the property was not permitted by law,"

There was

no other testimony offered by the property owner in this
case which would have provided an acceptable basis for
his testimony.

He did not recite sales of comparable

properties to support his opinion of value/ He did not
testify that he made a cost analysis of what it would
cost to replace the improvements on the property and
then deduct accrued depreciation in order to establish
the value of the improvements and then add the value of
the land.

He did not utilize a capitalized rental income

approach as a method of establishing market valuer

These

are the traditional methods used by evaluation witnesses
in establishing market value of real estate in condemnation cases.
If the property owner's testimony were allowed to
stand, it; would allow property owners in all such cases
to say virtually anything they wanted to regarding the
value of their property.

An owner could say property,

to him, was worth any amount and whether that testimony
was based on the value to him because of his sentimental
attachment or because he felt he had developed some business "good will" over the years his testimony would still
stand just because he was an "owner."

Such inadmissible

testimony would become admissible just because it came from
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an owner who had lived on the property for many years
and was familiar with it.
Plaintiff submits that an owner is subject to the
same restrictions as to the admissibility of his testimony (after qualification as a witness) as any other witness.

If the basis for the testimony of an appraiser

is inadmissible because he used improper elements in
establishing fair market value the same basis or elements
are not rendered unobjectionable because they come from
the mouth of the "owner."
The defendants, in their Petition for Rehearing,
have confused a property owner's right to testify with
the substantive content of his testimony.

The right to

testify may exist, but the content of the testimony offered may be inadmissible.

In the instant case, even

if the right of the owner to testify did exist, the opinion testimony offered by him relating to value should
have been stricken, since it lacked proper foundation
and was based on elements of value which are inadmissible in a condemnation trial.
The plaintiff respectfully requests that this court
deny the defendants1 Petition for Rehearing, that the
original finding of this court stand and this case be
remanded to the District Court for a new trial*
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD S. COLEMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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